The successful development and marketing of commercial high-availability systems requires the ability to evaluate the availability of systems. Specifically, one should be able to demonstrate that projected customer requirements are met, to identify availability bottlenecks, to evaluate and compare different configurations, and to evaluate and compare different designs. For evaluation approaches based on analytic modeling, these systems are often sufficiently complex so that state-space methods are not effective due to the large number of states, whereas combinatorial methods are inadequate for capturing all significant dependencies. The two-level hierarchical decomposition proposed here is suitable for the availability modeling of blade server systems such as IBM BladeCentert, a commercial, high-availability multicomponent system comprising up to 14 separate blade servers and contained within a chassis that provides shared subsystems such as power and cooling. This approach is based on an availability model that combines a high-level fault tree model with a number of lowerlevel Markov models. It is used to determine component level contributions to downtime as well as steady-state availability for both standalone and clustered blade servers. Sensitivity of the results to input parameters is examined, extensions to the models are described, and availability bottlenecks and possible solutions are identified.
INTRODUCTION
Blade server systems are available that can be used to meet high-availability requirements for many commercial systems, such as e-commerce, financial, stock trading, and telephone communications, in addition to several types of life-critical and safetycritical systems. However, it is all too common for server modules (blades) to be used as stand-alone servers with shared services without carefully considering how best to configure the environment to maximize availability. Many techniques to achieve high availability are known. [1] [2] [3] [4] Technical analysis is used frequently for quantifying computer system characteristics such as reliability and availability; [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] many software packages supporting such analyses are available. 9, 10, [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] Nevertheless, such Ó Copyright 2008 by International Business Machines Corporation. Copying in printed form for private use is permitted without payment of royalty provided that (1) each reproduction is done without alteration and (2) the Journal reference and IBM copyright notice are included on the first page. The title and abstract, but no other portions, of this paper may be copied or distributed royalty free without further permission by computer-based and other information-service systems. Permission to republish any other portion of the paper must be obtained from the Editor. 0018-8670/08/$5.00 Ó 2008 IBM analysis is not routinely carried out on commercial high-availability products like blade server systems. There are only islands of such competency, even in large companies.
When such analysis is attempted, engineers commonly use reliability block diagrams or fault trees to formulate and solve such availability models because of their simplicity and efficiency. 18, 20 But such combinatorial models cannot easily incorporate realistic system behavior such as less-than-complete (imperfect) fault coverage, multiple failure modes, hot-swap components, etc. 21, 22 By contrast, such dependencies and multiple failure modes can be easily captured by state-space models such as Markov chains, 22 semi-Markov processes, 23 and
Markov regenerative processes. 23 But the computational requirements for building, storing, and solving such state space models for real systems can become prohibitive. 7, 8 The problem of large model construction can be alleviated by using some variation of stochastic Petri nets, 7, 8, 14, 19 but a more practical alternative is to use a hierarchical approach where a judicious combination of state space models and combinatorial models is utilized. 15, 18 Such hierarchical models have been successfully used to solve many practical problems. 9, 10, [24] [25] [26] The purpose here is to provide a practical approach for evaluating the availability of blade server systems, to apply it to the IBM BladeCenter*, and to show how these designs can be easily configured to achieve extremely high availability, suitable even for some mission-critical application environments. In the two-level hierarchical approach that is employed in this analysis, each subsystem is modeled as a Markov chain, whereas the entire system is modeled as a fault tree because some of the system component failures affect several different portions of the system at the same time. Such effects can be captured by fault trees with repeated events but cannot be captured by other methods, such as traditional reliability block diagrams. 20, 21 The BladeCenter is a system whose complexity precludes its modeling as a single-level state space model. The number of components in the BladeCenter that are subject to failure is close to 140. If each component were to be in one of two states only (although some components actually have more than two states), the size of the state space of the overall Markov chain will be 2 140 . However, as various dependencies exist in the system, an overall combinatorial model will not suffice. The dependencies within BladeCenter subsystems are modeled in this paper by employing homogeneous continuous-time Markov chains. Independence across subsystems is assumed and hence, a combinatorial model is used to aggregate the subsystem availabilities into the overall system availability.
The stochastic models developed here are solved in order to quantify the availability of single and multiple blades as well as to identify key contributors to downtime. The expected uptime of a single server blade in a chassis can be significantly increased by understanding contributors of downtime and configuring the BladeCenter appropriately. Further analysis of the full fault tree shows how, as blade-based server systems scale out by adding more nodes to the system configuration, downtime can be minimized by using spare blades in hotstandby mode. Markov submodels are able to capture the detailed dependencies within each subsystem. However, our assumption that subsystems behave independently does not hold if a single, shared repair person provides repairs for all the subsystems, because of contention for that repair person, repair prioritization, and so on. The effect of such dependencies on the software submodel is addressed in the Extensions section by way of fixedpoint iteration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief description of the BladeCenter product and the key assumptions made in modeling it. In the following section, models are developed for the BladeCenter subsystems, which include chassis components (midplane, cooling subsystem, power domain, and network subsystem) and blade server components (blade server, processor subsystem, software, memory subsystem, and disk storage subsystem). The section that follows describes the way in which a hierarchical model for BladeCenter availability is created that makes use of the submodels developed in the previous section. Hardware and software input parameters are discussed and the model results are examined. Sensitivity of these results to software failure rates, service response times, and midplane common mode faults is provided. Areas for further investigation and future extension of this model are described in the Extensions section. These include a fixed-point iteration methodology to capture repair dependence and techniques to relax the assumption of exponentially distributed failure and repair times. The concluding section examines the availability bottlenecks in the BladeCenter architecture, along with design and configuration alternatives, and closes with a summary of the capabilities of this hardware architecture to support various levels of availability.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Blade servers have been widely adopted, in part because of their modular design, a multi-server frame technology that is available from several server vendors. These designs are based on industry-standard racks, and provide denser packaging facilitated by shared power, cooling and other common services within the chassis. Integrated network switches provide additional conservation of space and significant reductions in cabling. Total cost of ownership can be reduced through simplification of management tasks such as deploying, reprovisioning, updating, and troubleshooting hundreds of servers. The IBM BladeCenter system shown in Figure 1 is one such design, supporting up to 14 computing elements known as blade servers.
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From the front side, access is provided to the control panel, removable media devices, and the blade servers. Network switch modules, power supplies, cooling devices, and management modules are located at the rear of the chassis. All these devices plug into a central midplane that provides power distribution, sideband management buses, and network interconnections. The midplane is a redundant, fail-in-place design. Power domain 1 consists of power supplies 1 and 2. These power supplies are redundant and all devices attached to power domain 1 remain operational if one of the power supplies fails. Similarly, power domain 2 consists of power supplies 3 and 4, which are also redundant. Power domain 2 supplies blades 7-14, as indicated by shaded blocks in Figure 1 . Everything else in the BladeCenter chassis is supplied by power domain 1.
For the work described here, IBM BladeCenter HS20 blade servers are configured with two Intel** Xeon** processors, four 1-gigabyte double-datarate-2 synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR2 SDRAM) dual in-line memory modules (DIMMs), and one or two small-form-factor (SFF) serial attached SCSI (SAS) disk drives (SCSI stands for Small Computer System Interface). Disk drives may be configured as Redundant Array of Independent Disks 1 (RAID1) arrays so that the blade server can continue to operate when one of the two disk drives fails. These blade servers also have the ability to recover in degraded mode from processor or memory failures by de-configuration of the failed components and restarting the blade server. Each of these fault recovery capabilities can improve customer uptime and they are reflected in the blade server submodels described in the following sections.
A typical configuration consists of a chassis with redundant blowers, two power domains each containing two redundant power supply modules, redundant management modules, redundant Ethernet switches, and redundant Fiber Channel network 
MODELS OF BLADECENTER SUBSYSTEMS
BladeCenter subsystems fall into two categories: shared subsystems that are found in the chassis, and blade subsystems that are part of each blade server. The submodels described here were developed to investigate BladeCenter hardware availability. Software failures are introduced in the model to put the relative contributions of the hardware and of the software stack to downtime into perspective. Generally, permanent hardware faults in components are assumed. In addition, soft or transient faults are also considered in some of the hardware components. 1 16, 28 In this paper, all times to failure are assumed to be exponentially distributed. Similarly, all other event times, such as the time to repair and field service response time, are all assumed to be exponentially distributed. Techniques for relaxing this assumption are discussed in the Extensions section. Time to repair is separated out into response time of the repair person (including travel time) and the actual time to diagnose and to repair or replace the component affected. The phrase imperfect repair refers to a failure to fix a problem on the first attempt and to delays in obtaining necessary replacement parts. Imperfect repair is not included, but the models can be easily extended to include this aspect of time to repair. First, the Markov submodels of each of the subsystems are described.
Chassis midplane submodel
Each BladeCenter chassis contains a midplane that provides the interconnect paths between the blade servers, network switches, management modules, and so on. The midplane was designed to minimize the probability that it causes a blade server outage by the following design decisions: 1) the midplane contains only a few active components; 2) it provides two independent sets of interconnects to each blade; and 3) it has two independent connectors to each set of interconnects. Thus, the chassis midplane is a fail-in-place design, allowing the chassis to tolerate failure of either half of the midplane while the blade servers continue to function without an operational outage by utilizing the backup communication paths.
The midplane is represented by the Markov submodel in Figure 2 . The midplane fails with a mean time to failure (MTTF) of mttfmp. 
The midplane also provides power distribution within the chassis through two power domains. This SMITH ET AL. IBM SYSTEMS JOURNAL, VOL 47, NO 4, 2008 is discussed in more detail in the description of the power domain submodel and in the top-level model description.
Chassis cooling submodel
The BladeCenter cooling subsystem contains two redundant hot-pluggable blowers. The Markov submodel in Figure 3 is used to represent both the cooling subsystem and the power domain subsystem. States 26 Strictly speaking, the model will then be a semi-Markov process (SMP). But it is known that the steady-state solution of an SMP only depends on the mean sojourn time in its states, so treating the SMP as a Markov chain does not introduce any error in the steady-state solution in this case. 23, 26 However, both states are included here in order to explore the significance of the repair dependency when a single repair person is assumed (see Extensions). The second blower could also fail while the subsystem is under repair in state 3. Here, the transition occurs to state 4 and, since the repair person is already on-site, only a repair time for both blowers is required to return the subsystem to state 2. Let d(cooling) represent the denominator for the closed-form expression for steady-state availability of this submodel. Then, the steady-state availability of the cooling subsystem, A cooling , is given in Equations (2) and (3) and have mean times of repair of mttrsp and mttrps2 for 1 or 2 power supplies, respectively. This model differs from the cooling subsystem model in that, when one of the power supply modules fails in state 2, an uncovered or common mode fault can bring both of the power supplies down with probability (1-cpsub), as depicted by the dashed transition from state 2 to state 0. Let d(power) represents the expression for the denominator. Then, a closed-form expression for the steady-state availability of the power supply subsystem, A power , is given in Equations (4) and (5)
3ðmttrps2 þ mttrspÞ þ 3 3 mttrps1 3 mttrspÞ þ 2 3 mttrps1 3 mttrsp 3ðmttrsp þ mttrps2Þ ð4Þ A power ¼ mttf ps dðpowerÞ 3ð2 3 cpsub 3 mttrps1 3 mttf ps þ ðmttf ps þ mttrps1Þ 3ðmttf ps þ mttrspÞ þ 2 3 cpsub 3 mttrsp 3ðmttf ps þ mttrps1ÞÞ: ð5Þ
Chassis network switch submodels Each BladeCenter chassis can accommodate four network switch devices that are configured as two pairs of identical network switches for redundancy. For the purposes of the BladeCenter model presented here, only Ethernet and Fiber Channel networks are represented, although InfiniBand and other technologies are supported.
The network switches are represented by a simple alternating renewal process model that has two states. Switch failures occur with an MTTF of mttfesw for the Ethernet switch (or mttffcsw for the Fiber Channel switch). When down, the switch is replaced and service restored to the up state in a time that is the sum of the mean time for service response (mttrsp) plus the mean time to repair of the switch. Closed-form expression for the steady-state availability of the Ethernet switch subsystem is given in Equation (6) and of the Fiber Channel switch subsystem in Equation (7) Aethsw ¼ mttf esw mttf esw þ mttresw þ mttrsp ð6Þ
Blade server processor submodel Each blade server has 2 processors. The processor or CPU subsystem is represented by the Markov submodel in Figure 4 , which has six states. States 2 and 1 are UP states representing the blade server with two or one operational processors. While in state 2, the processor subsystem may experience a failure represented by the transition to state 4. This event may be due to a transient hardware fault with probability cpt that is assumed to occur in 1 percent of failures. In this case, the fault clears on reboot and the processor subsystem recovers to state 2, as depicted by the dashed transition, when the blade server reboots. Otherwise, the failure is a hard fault that is detected on blade server reboot and the processor subsystem recovers in degraded mode to state 1 with a single functioning processor.
In state 1, a service person is summoned with a mean time to respond of mttrsp. When this person arrives the blade server must be removed for repair, so the processor subsystem enters the DOWN state 3 for the repair and then returns to state 2 once it is completed. If the second processor fails while the processor subsystem is still in state 1, then no functioning processors are left. The blade server is unable to reboot and the subsystem transitions to the DOWN state 0, from which a repair person is summoned and the repair process is completed, restoring the subsystem to state 2. A closed-form expression for the steady-state availability of the processor subsystem is given in Equation (8)
Blade server memory submodel Each blade server has two banks of memory. Each bank comprises two memory DIMMs. The memory subsystem is also represented by the Markov submodel in Figure 4 . States 2 and 1 are UP states representing the blade server with two or one operational banks of error correction code (ECC) protected memory, respectively. While in state 2, the memory subsystem may experience an unrecoverable multi-bit error represented by the transition to state 4. The error is processed by blade server BIOS and the memory experiencing the multi-bit error is always deconfigured so that the dashed transition from state 4 to state 2 is not used here. The blade server reboots to state 1 at rate mttboot1 and the blade recovers utilizing the remaining memory bank.
In state 1, the repair person is summoned with a mean time to respond of mttrsp. Since the blade server must be removed from the chassis to replace memory, the repair is performed in DOWN state 3 with a mean time to repair of mttrmem. If the second memory bank fails prior to arrival of the repair person, no memory is operational and the memory subsystem enters the DOWN state 0 until the repair person arrives (state 5) and the repair is completed, restoring the memory subsystem to state 2. A closedform expression for the steady-state availability of the memory subsystem is given in Equation (9) A memory ¼ ðð2 3 mttrsp 3 mttf memÞ 4ððmttf mem þ mttrspÞ
Blade server disk and RAID submodels Two configurations for the disk subsystem are considered. One configuration uses a single disk in each blade, while the other uses a mirrored RAID1 disk per blade. In the first case, a disk is modeled as an alternating renewal process, similarly to the network switch submodel discussed earlier. A closed-form solution for the availability of this simple disk subsystem is found in Equation (10) . 
For the second case, the Markov submodel captures the behavior of dual disk drives in a mirrored configuration (i.e., RAID 1) where one disk drive can fail and all data and programs are still accessible via the remaining disk drive. The RAID subsystem has six states (see Figure 5 ). Both disk drives are in operation in state 2. The MTTF of each disk drive is mttf_hdd. States 1 and 5 are UP states representing the blade server with one operational disk drive.
When the RAID controller chip on the blade server detects that a drive has failed, the RAID subsystem enters state 1. The remaining drive supplies all data to the blade server. A repair person is summoned with a mean time to respond of mttrsp and the subsystem enters DOWN state 3 since the blade server must be removed from service to replace the drive. If the second drive fails before the arrival of the repair person, the RAID subsystem transitions from state 1 to DOWN state 0, with no remaining drives, where it remains until the repair person arrives and the repair is completed. In state 3, the disk drive is replaced with a mean time to repair of mttr_hdd and the subsystem enters UP state 5. Then, the data must be copied onto the new disk drive with a mean time to completion of mttcopy. If the new drive fails during the copy process, then the subsystem returns to state 3 and that drive is replaced a second time. From state 5, it is also possible for the disk drive holding the data to fail before the copy is completed. In that case, the subsystem enters the DOWN state 4. In both states 0 and 4, both disk drives are replaced with fresh preloaded drives with a mean time to repair of mttr_hdd_2. Let d(raid) represent the denominator; then, a closed-form expression for the steady-state availability of the DISK subsystem utilizing RAID 1, A RAID , is given in Equations (11) and (12) dðraidÞ
Blade server base hardware and network interface controller submodels The blade server base hardware and network interface controller (NIC) hardware are each represented by a simple alternating renewal process model that has two states. Failures occur with an MTTF of mttfbase for the base hardware, with mttfniceth for the Ethernet NIC or mttfnicfc for the Fiber Channel NIC. When down, the blade server hardware is replaced and service restored to the UP state in a time that is the sum of the mean time for service response (mttrsp) plus the a mean time to repair of each of these elements of the blade server. Closed-form expressions for the availability of these submodels are given in Equations (13) through (15) A base ¼ mttf base mttf base þ mttrbase þ mttrsp ð13Þ 
Blade server software submodel The blade server software is represented by the Markov submodel shown in Figure 6 . While the software images may be identical or very similar, especially in the case of clustered blades with hotstandby spares, the software environment and workload on each blade server is unique and not replicated elsewhere. The model has five states. State 0 is the UP state. Even without a hardware failure, blade server software can crash or hang and the blade server enters the DOWN state 1 until the operating system can perform a fast reboot and the middleware and applications can restart. A software failure is covered by a fast reboot with probability c1 (definitions of all variables used in this paper are found in the Appendix). If the failure is not covered by fast reboot, then the system moves to state 2, where a longer reboot and recovery action such as consistency checks and automated data recovery are attempted. This step will be successful with a coverage factor of c2 and the software returns to state 0. Otherwise, the software enters state 3, where a repair person is required to restore corrupted data or to perform a software repair or other recovery action. The dashed transition from state 2 to state 4 is not used in the base model. It is used to account for an onsite repair person as part of the repair dependency discussion in the Extensions section. Conceptually, manual recovery will be required to deal with residual Bohrbugs (i.e., a bug that manifests itself reliably under a well-defined but possibly unknown set of conditions), while the faster automated recovery will succeed if the failure is caused by a Mandelbug (i.e., a bug whose causes are so complex that its behavior apears chaotic). 16 A closed-form expression for the steady-state availability of the software subsystem is given in Equation (16) A sof tware ¼ ðmttf swÞ 4ðmttboot1 3ð1 À c1Þ 3 mttboot2
BLADECENTER AVAILABILITY MODEL The BladeCenter availability model was created to represent a fully redundant multi-server chassis configuration using multiple network links (in this case Ethernet and Fiber Channel), such as might be available from any of several vendors. The submodels described in the previous section capture many of the details of the BladeCenter architecture and design that affect system uptime and availability when these platforms are used for customer solutions. By assuming independence, these submodels are now combined with basic events into a fault-tree model.
Top-level fault tree
The top-level fault tree for the BladeCenter availability model is shown in Figure 7 . The BladeCenter system is DOWN if the top event labeled System failure is TRUE. Three types of gates are used in this fault tree. The output of an AND gate is TRUE (i.e., DOWN) if all inputs are TRUE. The output of an OR gate is TRUE if any of its inputs are TRUE. The output of a k-out-of-n (KOFN) gate is TRUE if k or more of the n inputs are TRUE. The inputs to the KOFN gate are sub-fault-tree models representing the blade servers. The KOFN gate in the fault tree allows evaluation of various combinations of required and hot-spare blades. Inputs 1-6 are used for instances of blades in power domain 1. Similarly, inputs 7-14 are used for instances of blade servers in power domain 2.
Note that both of the Fiber Channel switches and both of the Ethernet switches are shared by all of the n blades, while the dual-network interfaces of each type on each blade are matched up with their corresponding switches. An OR gate is used to pair each network switch with a port on the blade. Thus, if either port on the blade or its switch goes DOWN, communication on that link is DOWN. If the blade cannot communicate through at least one port to each network type, then the blade is considered DOWN. Such interrelations cannot be captured by traditional reliability block diagrams, 21 so a fault tree with the repeated events construct is used. 18 This fault tree is used to evaluate the solution level availability that might be achieved by using the BladeCenter hardware platform in those solutions. Evaluating the top-level fault tree with k and n set to 1 provides the availability offered by any single blade in isolation installed in a slot in Power Domain 1. Note that each Markov submodel is simple enough to obtain a closed-form analytic solution.
The SHARPE software package 29, 18 is used to produce a closed-form answer for the overall availability for the case of a single blade (that is the case with n ¼ 1) in the fault tree. The availability of a single blade with software and the entire common Hardware input parameters There are a variety of methods that may be used to predict the reliability of the hardware of a computer. A few of the industry standards include Telcordia** SR332 33 and MIL-HDBK-217. 34 While these have been used for many years, there are some issues that may arise with their use. SR332 prior to Issue 2 uses a 90-percent confidence level on its statistics. While this is useful for worst-case analysis work, it is troublesome for predicting what the actual level of failure rate will be and what corrections should be factored into the analysis. Another issue can be the age of these approaches and whether they have current data for the technologies used in the design. Some large organizations have the resources to work with supplier data, test data, and field data to such a degree as to allow them to develop their own reliability data sets for the devices that they design into their products. Whatever method used, it is important to account for all types of incidents that cause a particular component to cease operating within the design limits of the system. Replacements that, under a given set of operational conditions, result from material degradation and failure mechanisms at the microstructure level are broadly termed as physics-of-failure-caused (POF-caused). In addition to POF, other causes of replacement could be test escapes, induced damage from manufacturing, shipping or installation, improper interaction over the boundaries of field replaceable units, among others. Even though this paper uses the expected rate of replacement, the terms replacement and failure will be used interchangeably.
The failure rate experienced in the field will seldom be a constant rate, though for purposes of simplified mathematics it is common to treat it as such. To get to that stage, it is necessary to determine what ''average'' to use in the model. Common points are: during the life of the product, during the warranty period, during the first year, and at the point on the failure-rate curve that is reasonably close to constant.
The hardware input parameters used for this model are based on the IBM MTTF predictions for each replaceable hardware unit. These predictions are based on an industry-standard parts-count method adjusted using proprietary methods and field history to approximate the average field replacement rates under nominal conditions. These predictions are not constant values, but rather curves based on hours of operation. Typically, these curves follow a Weibull rather than an exponential distribution. In practice, the end of product design life should occur before entering the physical wear-out phase of the product. So, that phase need not be considered in the models. Experience has shown that the electronic subsystems in BladeCenter-type products have reached the constant failure-rate phase of the Weibull distribution by the end of the twelfth month of continuous operation (i.e., 8760 hours). That data point on the failure-rate curve for each subsystem is the basis for the MTTF values for the BladeCenter model, and an exponential distribution can be reasonably assumed for the period after the first year of operation.
Data of this type is generally vendor-confidential, and the actual values are not available for publication. A range of typical MTTF values for the subassemblies used in this model are listed in Table 1 . The assumed mean time to service response, mttrsp, is based on a service agreement that allows an average of 2.5 hours time for a service person to arrive on-site for the repair. is included, it provides insight into the relative contribution of software to downtime and it is used to evaluate the use of spare server blades to overcome software as a source of downtime. For this exercise, a value of two years (17,520 hours) is used for the MTTF of the software, mttfsw, to show the effects of frequent software interruptions on blade server downtime and availability. When a software failure occurs, the success of the quick reboot is based on a coverage factor, c1, of 0.85 with a mean boot time, mttboot1, of 20 minutes. A longer, more complex reboot of the software is attempted if the short boot is not successful. This success of the longer reboot is based on the coverage factor, c2 of 0.95 with mean boot time, mttboot2, of 45 minutes. Any faults not recovered by the quick or the complex reboots require attention from a repair person, who responds with a mean time of mttrsp and completes the patch or repair of the software in mean time, mttrsw, of 2 hours. In practice, the actual software parameters are dependent on both the operating system chosen and the software stack that is implemented. However, the MTTF value chosen is consistent with observations of the software aging processes that led to software rejuvenation as a means to avoid system downtime. 12 
Software input parameters

Model results
Utilizing the low and high MTTF values found in Table 1 as well as the predicted actual MTTF for each field-replaceable unit (FRU), the availability and expected annual downtime for a single blade are examined. In Table 2 , the shared hardware composed of the midplane, power supplies in power domain 1, and blowers are examined. For all three MTTF values, the shared hardware is responsible for less than one minute of annual downtime. This is well below the 5-minutes-per-year limit for a fivenines (i.e., .99.999 percent) availability solution. In addition, row 2 of Table 2 shows that a blade server plus network switches can be expected to have greater than 5 minutes but less than 50 minutes of annual downtime. Thus, the blade server hardware is a four-nines availability solution. Finally, the combined values for blade server, network switches, and shared hardware are shown in row 3 and the total blade server solution is also expected to provide availability greater than 99.99 percent.
In Table 3 , the downtime contributions of the hardware components are itemized, along with the contribution from the software. Here, software MTTF is identical for all three cases of hardware MTTF considered. The portion of the hardware and software downtime contributed by service response time was also determined. For predicted hardware MTTF values, service response represents about 35 percent of total downtime and represents a significant availability bottleneck that can only be addressed with changes to the service-delivery process. The nonredundant electronics on the blade server (base þ NICs þ network switches) and the disk drives are the largest contributors of hardwarerelated downtime. While high-reliability disk drives might appear to be the answer to decreased downtime, high MTTF values for drives may be more a matter of operational and environmental conditions than any really significant differences in the hardware. So, other options should be considered. The downtime associated with the disk drive can be virtually eliminated by using a RAID 1 configuration if a scheduled maintenance window can be used for disk replacement. To quantify the downtime when no maintenance window is available, further evaluation was done utilizing the predicted disk MTTF for the disk drives and the RAID submodel shown in Figure 5 . The results revealed that the disk-drive downtime can be reduced to 1.75 minutes/year when the two disk drives are configured for disk mirroring (RAID 1) and disk drives are replaced as the failures occur. In this case, the service person responds while the Base blade 220,000 300,000
Ethernet switch 120,000 160,000
blade server is still operational using the single remaining disk. Another option is to run the mirrored array until both disks fail. The outage time is longer in that scenario due to the extra downtime resulting from the repair delay while waiting for a service person to arrive after the second disk fails, and the average downtime contribution doubles to 3.6 minutes/year.
Spare blades are often considered as a means to achieve high availability. For the configuration and operational assumptions modeled, Table 4 gives the probability of exactly n operational out of 14 total blade servers. Either 14 or 13 operational blades is the most likely scenario, due to 0 or 1 blade server failures. There is only a very small probability of more than 2 simultaneous blade server failures; hence, BladeCenter availability does not improve with more than 2 spare blade servers.
Additional calculations were performed to predict downtime based on the minimum number of blade Table 4 shows total downtime for all blades based on the number of required blade servers in column 1 and number of hot-standby spares in column 2. From these results, it can be seen that one hot-standby blade offers a significant improvement in availability of the blade servers in the chassis. A second hot spare offers a further improvement that might be useful for extremely high-availability applications. Utilizing more than two blades as hotstandby spares provides negligible further return on investment in terms of downtime reduction. It is also worth noting that the total downtime for a 14-blade server chassis is slightly less than 14 times the predicted downtime for a single-blade server. This result reflects the effect of multiple, simultaneous blade server failures. Table 4 also shows a small probability of exactly 6 operational blade servers.
The most likely cause of this condition would be a power domain 2 failure. In that case, all spare blade servers must reside in power domain 2 so that the there are still 6 operable blades under this fault condition.
It is common to utilize models to examine the sensitivity of systems and solutions to various parameters. One such parameter for the BladeCenter model is the common mode factor in the midplane submodel (see Figure 2) . The common mode factor might be a major concern when mission-critical solutions depend on the BladeCenter system. The results presented here utilize a common mode factor based on analysis of the design. The expected contribution of the midplane to the total downtime of a blade is 0.74 minutes/year. However, as shown in Figure 8 , overall blade downtime due to midplane outages remains nearly constant as the common mode factor is increased by multiples of up to 10 times the initial value, indicating that uptime is not sensitive to this factor.
Another important parameter is the mean time to service response, the delay between a failure and the arrival of a repair person. This is a factor that is found in all the submodels, and it can significantly increase the duration of a BladeCenter outage by prolonging the service-delivery process. Service response is one factor that can be controlled. Options such as on-site maintenance and quickresponse service level agreements are available. In the results presented here, a mean time to service response of 2.5 hours is assumed. However, other (mostly longer) times could have been used and actual experiences may, in fact, be longer due to an imperfect service-delivery model. In Figure 8 , the mean time to service response time is multiplied by factors ranging from 1 to 10 to determine the sensitivity of downtime to this parameter. Downtime increases dramatically as mean time to service response is scaled upward, indicating that blade downtime is highly sensitive to this parameter.
Finally, the sensitivity of software failure rate to overall BladeCenter downtime is considered. Initially, mean time to software failure was estimated at 2 years. As the software failure rate is multiplied by factors of 1 to 10, BladeCenter downtime increases even more dramatically than with increased service response time, indicating that blade downtime is even more sensitive to changes in this parameter.
EXTENSIONS
There are several underlying assumptions in this model that warrant further consideration. First, the model assumes a perfect repair process (i.e., that repair attempts are always successful). In practice, faulty spare parts, incorrect fault diagnosis, and lack of training or skill on the part of the repair person can result in imperfect repair. Faulty repair may also result when replacement parts are not readily available, although on-site spare parts may alleviate that concern. Second, the model assumes that a service person begins the hardware repair in an average service response time of 2.5 hours. Depending on user requirements and system configuration, longer repair times might be acceptable, while still maintaining the required system uptime. But, if timely repair is required, on-site personnel or a service contract with response-time guarantees might be needed. Third, the model assumes that the BladeCenter system is operating continuously. Incorporating periods of scheduled downtime for maintenance may reduce unscheduled customer outage time. In particular, midplane and disk drive replacements (RAID only) could be performed during scheduled outages. The models can be extended to further explore these possibilities, and to ensure the highest possible uptime. 35 In In any case, the effect of such repair dependence is expected to be minimal, allowing independence to be reasonably assumed.
This point is demonstrated by extending the software Markov model to incorporate the effect of shared repair. The expanded software submodel is depicted in Figure 6 by using the transition rates for the expanded model. Here, the possibility that the repair person is already on-site to repair another subsystem is taken into account by including the dashed transition from state 2 to state 4. The probability that the repair person is not on-site, poff, is the product of state probabilities of all the states of other submodels where the repair person is not onsite.
The software submodel is further enhanced to account for the cases when the repair person is already engaged in a repair action. This repair action could be on any subsystem of the chassis or on any blade except the blade with the software failure. Additionally, the repair person is considered to be engaged if there exists a pending, higher-priority repair on the blade that encountered the software failure. Specifically, a blade could suffer a processor or memory hardware failure from which it has recovered in degraded mode. When a repair person arrives, the pending hardware repairs are given priority and repaired first. To account for the busy repair person, the repair rate out of state 4 of the software submodel is multiplied by a factor, r_nu, the probability that the repair person is not busy. To obtain r_nu, each submodel is evaluated to determine the probability that that submodel is not in a state with an active or pending higher-priority repair. Then, r_nu is iteratively computed as the product of these probabilities for each of the other submodels. The effect on the software submodel of this dependence is found to be negligible, as shown in Table 5 . Here, it is evident that, under the current set of assumptions for the model parameters, the effect of these two repair dependencies is too small to affect the model results. In fact, poff actually improves software availability by sometimes eliminating the service-response delay, while r_nu accounts for the wait for an on-site repair person to complete another repair and slows the mean rate at which software repairs are completed. Also note that poff and r_nu converge here after the first iteration. That occurs because these dependencies are only factored into the software submodel. Recall, however, that most of the BladeCenter submodels represent redundant, hot-pluggable subsystems, so that there is no system downtime due to these dependencies in those cases. Finally, note that the nonredundant subsystems are primarily contained in the blade, and software is no longer running if one of those has previously failed. Had these factors been necessary in other submodels, convergence would require additional iterations.
While the effect of non-exponentially distributed failure times can be significant, the effect of the deviation of all other distributions from the exponential is often found to be insignificant. Furthermore, the times to failure and the times to repair of a subsystem without redundancy can be general, as the corresponding availability model is the alternating renewal process. 26 The justification of the use of exponential distribution for the failure times is the lack of availability of adequate data on distribution information. If distribution information is available and if one or more distributions are in fact found to be non-exponential, methods are available to enhance the models to take these into account 23, 26, 38 without any significant increase in complexity of the overall hierarchical modeling technique. While the full treatment of non-exponential distributions is beyond the scope of this paper, the general idea is provided below. instance, consider state 2 of the memory submodel of Figure 4 , where the only outgoing arc, in reality, is based on a competition between times to failure of the two memory modules. If these times to failure were to be non-exponentially distributed, the resulting semi-Markov process would not have the insensitivity property and its steady-state probabilities would indeed depend on the nature of the distribution. If the chosen distribution is Weibull, the recommended method is to fit the Weibull distribution to a phase-type distribution and hence expand the Markov chain to incorporate these phases. For further details, see Reference 38.
In this paper, it was necessary to resort to numerical solution of the fault-tree and Markov models to produce the desired results. It is possible to solve the models in closed-form, as shown for all Markov submodels in this paper. Such closed-form solutions can potentially provide more insights, and can be used to compute derivatives of measures of interest and hence find bottlenecks. However, closed-form solution even for Markov model steady-state behavior is compute-intensive and can stress the tools such as Wolfram Mathematica**. 39 Fault trees can be solved in closed-form using SHARPE. In any case, when the models are large, even if the closed-form solution is possible, the size may preclude all advantages.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, submodels for IBM BladeCenter chassis components and blade servers were first developed using Markov chains. Then, these submodels were used to create a hierarchical fault-tree model for the blade server system. This model was used to determine the downtime and availability of these systems, which were viewed as representatives of a class of high-availability products available in the marketplace. The results shown here were based on statistical mean failure rates and a number of underlying assumptions. Actual performance of a particular BladeCenter system may, of course, vary from these results.
Five major bottlenecks for availability were identified.
1. Software failures are responsible for about onehalf of the downtime minutes in these models. Additionally, blade server availability is highly sensitive to software reliability; therefore, poorly behaved software may significantly reduce uptime. Uptime can be increased through improved system design, by selection of highly reliable software, by using software replicas, and by integrating and testing software before deployment. 2. Service response time is distributed across all the submodels in this analysis and is accountable for more than one-third of the downtime minutes, and availability is also very sensitive to this parameter. Improving service response would also reduce the downtime attributed to software. Service response time is largely controlled by the service-delivery process and could be mostly eliminated with on-site repair persons. 3. Disk storage is the third-leading cause of downtime. Switching to a RAID 1 array rather than individual disk drives eliminates more than onehalf of these downtime minutes. Solid-state drives may be a more reliable alternative to the conventional disk drives modeled. Though not evaluated here, other alternatives are available, such as SAN solutions that could further reduce downtime by eliminating dependency on these devices within the blade servers. 4. The blade server base hardware and associated network ports and switches are the causes of most of the remaining downtime minutes. Since there are dual, redundant network ports and paths, the base blade hardware is actually the primary cause in this category. Base blade hardware could be made redundant by clustering blades and using hot-standby blade servers. With this solution, the downtime attributable to blade memory and CPU would also be virtually eliminated. 5. The only other significant availability bottleneck is the single point of repair created by the fail-inplace, redundant midplane of the chassis. This can be eliminated by clustering blade servers across two or more chassis units. Additionally, this approach has the potential to eliminate most of the downtime associated with any other shared hardware devices in the chassis, primarily because the clusters will remain UP, even if an uncovered power domain or other failure were to occur.
This analysis shows that:
BladeCenter-type chassis designs generate less than 5 minutes/year of downtime, so that achieving five-9s availability with a single blade server is possible; Current modular blade server designs deliver nearly five-9s hardware availability; and A fully populated chassis with two or more server blades in hot-standby mode can deliver five-9s BladeCenter availability, even with relatively poor software reliability.
Although this model is based on the IBM BladeCenter design, similar results could be derived for any similar product, with the outcome, of course, depending on component reliability, built-in redundancy, and chassis architecture. CITED REFERENCES
